Informal Session with Dr. Phyllis Bennis on
“Prospects and Challenges of UN Multilateralism”
New York, August 26, 2003


On August 26, 2003 the Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the UN hosted the second informal session on “Prospects and Challenges of UN Multilateralism.” The Permanent Mission invited Dr. Phyllis Bennis as the speaker at the informal forum. Dr. Bennis is an expert on US-UN relations, UN affairs, and the Middle East. Currently she is a senior Fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, DC. During the presentation Dr. Bennis presented her views on UN multilateralism, looking specifically at US-UN relations, the UN reform, and the Palestinian issue. Her presentation was summarized as follows:

Multilateralism, the US and UN Reform

Multilateralism focuses on relations between governments and the role of the UN has been seen as the center of it. However, a new internationalism has given rise to a new paradigm to understand international relations. The world has changed and nation states are no longer the only actors. The new internationalism also focuses on the struggle of North-South relations and the role of the UN within a new context. The role of civil society and the struggle for peace and justice has emerged as a new global phenomenon. Demonstrations for peace prior to the US led war on Iraq demonstrated the extent of the global threat perceived by geographically dispersed countries and also their ability to mobilize globally. This has strengthened internationalism.

In this context, we need to look at the UN and what it is and can be. In the past, the General Assembly represented the centerpiece of power. During the Cold War, there was an imposed paralysis on the Security Council. The legacy of colonialism (and the subsequent inability to discuss it) set the GA as the locus of power and the subsequent establishment of new agencies in the UN system to improve the lives of the poor, especially to improve the role of newly independent countries. This context gave rise to the NAM and the G-77. This trend lasted until the mid-1970s.

The creation of a new economic order led to a change in the position of the US with respect to the UN. Caught off guard, this change led to a mobilization of the south through vehicles such as the NAM and the G-77. This action forces the US to wake up and question what is going on. The US began efforts to undermine them, especially during the Reagan administration. Opposition to multilateralism grew, clearly demonstrated from Kirkpatrick and Bolton’s new ‘goal’ to undermine the UN. This had a significant impact on the UN: it concentrated power out of the GA and into the SC. From 1985 forward, the SC emerges as the center of the UN.

During this concentration of power in the SC, the US also began withholding dues from the UN. For many Americans, they remained unaware that this was happening. The impetus for this move came from a report by the Heritage Foundation which propounded the logic that the way to gain power in the UN is to withhold dues. Although this plan may sound counter logical, the thinking went that the US would obtain more power in withholding dues since countries would cater to you in the hopes of making you pay.

As the Cold War ended, the question of UN reform arose. However, the discourse remained problematic because it moved away from what existed and only dealt with change at the Security Council level. However, the discourse remains problematic because it moved away from what existed and only dealt with change at the Security Council level. The question of change should have dealt with empowering the GA, returning to earlier days. Such a discourse would provide a better sense of possibilities within this new internationalism and the US drive towards empire.

In the post-9/11 world, we witnessed an increase of negative drive and fear at the UN. 9/11 became an excuse for war and there was a fear of challenging the direction of US response. Bush needed to recognize that the US needed the rest of the world but the option was war or nothing. At the international level, US rhetoric was the same: either you are with us or with the terrorists. It was necessary not just to condemn terror but support the US response of war. The challenge for the UN was to take into account the fears arising from the post-9/11 situation but not allow it to determine the direction of the UN.

The Bush administration is divided up into 4 factions:

1. Ideologues – these are the most influential members (ex. Wolfowitz) surrounding Bush and have been together since the 1980s. They militarized the US and gave privilege to the Pentagon rather than the Department of State, effectively emphasizing military over diplomatic answers. They wanted to create a world where no country could imagine challenging US might and had a vision to remake the world (ex. US democracy etc.)

2. Old-fashioned conservatives – These members have more traditional view of power (ex. Rumsfeld, Cheney). If there is a problem somewhere, troops can solve it.

3. Pragmatic/multilateral wing – These people have been sidelined.

4. Military – They were opposed to the war in Iraq.

The combination of these forces led to an instrumentalist view of the UN: multilateralism meant an aggressive multilateralism.

Iraq and Palestine

About two years ago, I worked with the South African Mission on the question of international protection for Palestinians. The discussion at the time was to give the GA an opportunity to bring up the issue. If the SC remained paralyzed over the issue, the GA would be permitted (if not obligated) to take up the issue and effectively take over the call for Palestinian protection which includes Israeli civilians. This would happen in the following way:

1. A decision by countries like the NAM decide to negotiate a framework of a UN centered plan with respect to Palestine and Israel

2. The NAM caucus in the SC would try to pass it

3. The SC would be paralyzed

4. The NAM/G-77 would table a motion. A resolution would see the SC as deadlocked and the GA would be obligated under international law to intervene in Palestine/Israel.

5. Deployment of UN peacekeeping. Although the UN does not have the force of law, it has the obligation to intervene in crises. These peacekeepers would be deployed in four different groups. With the eyes of the world on them, the issue would become the Occupation versus the UN. This changes the nature and dynamics of the debate.

The current Roadmap is in trouble and has created false pretenses. The question of initiatives in the GA can be something as grandiose as the Palestine/Israel issue.

In terms of Iraq, people were discussing different resolutions:

1. Condemn the war and allow the US to send letter condemning an independent move by the UN

2. The ICJ would question the legality of a pre-emptive war.

However, the question always returns to the political will to get everyone on board to confront the US. It comes back to a partnership between civil society, governments and multilateralism.

Questions & Answers

Q1:
The role of the UN within the international system is inherently bipolar and we saw Powell attempting to get a coalition of the willing. With the transatlantic cleavage currently in place, will this make if more difficult for other powers to keep the US in check?

Q2:
Regarding the Middle East and a NAM/G-77 proposition for a peacekeeping force, how can we make this resolution? Also, the US says the UN is important but the US undermines the UN. How should other countries deal with the US?

Q3:
US power sets limitation to other countries’ foreign policy. Condemnation of the US undermines countries’ room for maneuvering. Countries should dare to initiate a first step. Should Muslim countries have some sort of coalition? Also, leaders have the opportunity to control the behavior of a group. Why has Bush been aligned with Rumsfeld and not Powell?

A123:
Regarding the issue of the coalition of the willing versus the UN coalition, Annan called for Chapter 7 deployment but it was a one-time statement. The US brought pressure on SC members and threatened to stop payments and aid. It was a way to sideline the UN. Chile was undergoing economic negotiations with the US and was told that it would sign only if Chile supported the war. Mexico was also under enormous pressure with Bush sidelining Fox. Guinea and Cameroon also receive US aid. Surprisingly, no one gave in. All the individual countries had principles but the support of the global civil society asking them to stand up to the US gave them a structure for collective resistance. The US essentially tried to buy support. It was a very fluid situation with both carrots and sticks. It becomes problematic when the US gives countries “permission” to do things.

The notion that the US and its collation can replace and override the UN is problematic. There is a need to think about how to challenge this.

Regarding the question of the Middle East, the situation will worsen. The UN needs to be involved and the issues need to be raised in the GA. The Charter calls for regional and then international responses. The problem is that Israel is excluded from the region and keeps itself out of the region. It is Israel’s choice. It is outside of normal relations with its neighbors and therefore their role in regional initiatives is problematic.

How can the South deal with the US? It needs to broaden its views of who are its colleagues in Washington. You need to look beyond Powell to Congress. 65% of Democrats voted against the war. Allies need to be sought out beyond the administration like in the Black Caucus, the Progressive Caucus etc.

In terms of Bush’s alliances, I’m not sure why. His father was much more of a multilateralist.

There is a need for collective response and the use of the UN through caucuses like NAM to address global threats like AIDS, poverty but also empire. There is a need to react to US power in not allowing the UN to respond.

Q4:
Powell can have an influence on multilateralism. What will be the influence in the Security Council?

Q5:
There is a need for reform and the democratization of the SC. What will the response of the US be?

Q6:
Regarding the Middle East conflict and the political role of the US, there is not enough political pressure in on Israel. How serious is the US in pursuing political aims?

Q7:
Has 9/11 led to a decreasing patience on the part of the Bush administration or is it due to the influence of his administration? Would Clinton have handled this differently?

A4567:
There is a trajectory. At the time of Powell’s rise, the US had more or less decided on war. Bush’s speech at the UN was an effort to see if it could bring the UN. It was a willingness to giver Powell one last chance. There was no sense that the US was in a position to determine what would happen. The UN will be irrelevant if it does not join the US.

The ideologues in the administration were from the beginning a main force. From January 2001 to September 2001, there was an overt shift to unilateralsim (the unsigning of the ICC, Kyoto). Their goals are clear. However, the response of the rest of the world was different. There was growing opposition. The US lost its seat on the human rights commission. In Johannesburg, the US attempted to get a walkout but only Israel followed. However, after 9/11, all opposition shut down.

On 9/11, Rumsfeld said he was going after Iraq. He knew they could get support for it.

If Clinton had been in power, media response would have been the same but war would not have been framed in empire.

The administration thinks that this is the way to remake the world. These assumptions are based on false information. Opposition groups were detached from the current situation in Iraq. The outcome of a happy ending did not happen. The Iraqi people are happy Hussein is gone but not with the US occupation.

The lack of pressure on Israel gives it little incentive to end the Occupation. They are creating a wall of apartheid. They would not be building it if they really wanted to tear down the wall and create a state of Palestine. There is a rhetoric of peace. The international community has an obligation. It must stop and look at the causes, which is the occupation of Palestine. The US is like a real estate broker, it helps the two sides negotiate but has a vested interest in one.

Regarding the democratization of the Security Council, the US will consistently fight it. This is not just about the US but all five permanent members. There is a need for an alternative power center. The issue of the GA is a viable option .

Q8:
Does the US have the resources for national building in so many countries? What are the implications of the first expansion of the NATO in Afghanistan outside of Europe?

Q9:
How easy is it for any member state to follow the GA debate of close to 200 states? Is this actually being put to good use?

A89:
The issues of the NATO peacekeeping force and democratization are about potential situations and not the current situation. Democratization is an ongoing process. The general debate is not necessary but the world gets to hear from everyone, heads of state etc. It is important to hear from each member. However, this is not democracy. There is no discussion. It is democratic in a relative sense. Multilateralism is not democratic. The challenge is to fight for democracy. Not all countries have the same level of interest. For instance, the ICC conference in Rome showed that is was difficult for small countries to address all issues. Cuba had 2 delegates; the US had 250. The world needs to deal with the issues at hand. There is some hope when we see the UN standing up to the US over the war.

--ooOoo--