Presentation by A. Introduction 1.a. On several occasions, in my capacity as Chairman-designate of the Third PrepCom for the 2005 Review Conference of the NPT, I have elaborated my thinking on how I would carry out my responsibilities. There I have spoken more on the organizational aspects of the PrepCom with few substantive issues that I dwelt upon. My presentation today will generally touch more on the substantive aspects, particularly those issues of common concern to Nuclear as well as Non-Nuclear Weapons States Parties to the NPT. 1.b. In this connection, I will begin my remarks by pointing out that of the six Review Conferences held so far since the NPT came into force in 1970, the ones held in 1980 and 1990 have ended with no agreement on a final declaration. The successes of the 1995 and 2000 review exercises were by any standards extra-ordinary. The consensus provisions contained therein reflected the recognition by all States Parties of a common interest in ensuring the credibility and longevity of the Treaty. 2. But it remains to be asked against the backdrop of a series of negative developments whether the gap between declarations and implementation which we have witnessed since that time warrant our assumption of success and a sense of optimism for the non-proliferation regime. Although the Treaty did not present the desired balance, it did, however, sets out a series of norms that were meant to be seriously observed. It is widely perceived now that the objectives of the Treaty have not been fully met. 3. From the view point of many non-nuclear-weapon-states (NNWS), the fundamental problems that existed since the inception of the Treaty has grown in magnitude and importance from one Review Conference to the other. They remain dissatisfied for a number of reasons. Among those state parties that have faithfully implemented the treaty, the increasing trend of proliferation have created wide-spread concern and sense of urgency to expeditely deal with this issue. The Treaty remains crucially important as the sole international instrument to prevent the spread of such horrendous weapons of mass destruction. 4. The Third PrepCom and the 2005 Review Conference will provide opportunities for State Parties to intensify efforts to overcome perennial issues of full implementation of the treaty’s provisions and realizing the objectives enshrined in the Treaty. In this connection, there are some important questions that could be raised, namely, how to promote a “balanced” approach among the three pillars of the NPT regime? How we deal with tendencies among some State Parties to re-interpret and selectively implementing obligations under the Treaty? How should we address difficult issues, such as security assurances, non-compliance, the Middle East and universality? And how we move forward from 2005? B. How to promote a balance among the three pillars? 5. It is widely recognized that the Treaty rests on three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. With regard to non-proliferation, the NPT is without doubt, an unparalleled success. This is because when compared to the projections of the 1960’s for 20 to 30 NWS, today, we have only de-facto 7 or probably 8 NWS. With few exceptions, all non-nuclear weapon-states have fulfilled their obligations both in spirit and letter of the Treaty. Some technologically advanced countries have refrained from exercising their nuclear option. This has demonstrated once again that acquiring nuclear weapons is a political, security and status question and not necessarily one of technical expertise. However, it is important to recognize the problem of non-compliance, which has recently emerged as a factor that threaten to undermine the Treaty. It has therefore become necessary to deal with this problem effectively. 6. Concerning nuclear disarmament aspect of the treaty, generally NNWS consider it of utmost importance to speed up the reduction pace toward the total abolition of these weapons since tens of thousands of nuclear warheads – the exact number is unknown – remain in arsenals of the NWS around the world. The achievements of the INF, START I and START II are indeed significant. However, a majority of NNWS are of the view that the link between non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament was the rationale for the coming into force of the NPT in 1970. Such a link was finally affirmed in the 2000 Final Document, dealing with Article VII and the security of NNWS, which “emphasizes that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing”. 7. As regards peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the central question is to ensure that a widening utilization does not pose risks of weaponization, and hence, to peace and security as the technology involved for civilian and military purposes are similar in many respects. Such utilization is far more important for many developing countries whose power resources are limited. For NNWS, the acquisition of technology, materials and training for their peaceful programs, represent in a direct way the most tangible benefits offered by the NPT. Therefore, from their point viewpoint, if there is one single issue that is critical for these nations, it remains civilian uses of nuclear energy. 8. A related concern has been assurances of supply. Countries seeking nuclear technology have long sought uninterrupted supply of materials and equipments needed to maintain their nuclear power programs. It appears that this fundamental objective has not been fully met and the relevant provisions of the Treaty have not been implemented to the satisfaction of the States concerned. This calls for a fresh appraisal of the Treaty’s commitments. On the other hand, in order to allay fears of diversion of such materials and equipment for weapons purposes and to induce confidence, it is deemed to be essential for the states parties to accede to the IAEA’s Additional Protocol. The nuclear weapon states can set example by themselves acceding to this Protocol. 9. One of the NPT’s pillars, that is, non-proliferation, in today’s international circumstances show considerable degree of uncertainty in so far as the proliferation threat is concerned. While the verification system under the IAEA safeguards system is being improved, concerns over possible clandestine nuclear weapon programs remain. In addition, DPRK’s stated withdrawal and decisions made by India, Israel, and Pakistan not to join the NPT may prompt some States parties to question the value of their continued adherence to the treaty. 10. Taken together, these are, indeed, formidable challenges, which suggest that we are in a new proliferation context. To surmount them, however, will require a sense of realism and pragmatism, and above all, what many States Parties have been saying for many years, political will and determination. Given these attributes, it remains within the realm of possibility to reaching consensus on what is admittedly a complex range of issues that would determine the prospects for the 2005 Review Conference. C. How to deal with re-interpretation of the Treaty’s obligations? 11. The NPT has established specific obligations to be undertaken by NWS and NNWS to ensure non-proliferation and move toward a nuclear-weapons-free-world. In examining the interpretation of the Treaty’s obligations, there are some concerns about certain states which became State Parties to the NPT, but prepared clandestinely to initiate nuclear weapons program. 12. It is important not to lose sight of the fact that any non-compliance by a state party to the NPT is potentially a serious blow to the long-term survival of the Treaty. But in the light of concerted international response, it can be seen that the norms of non-proliferation remain strong and robust. In this respect, the NPT obligations of the NNWS and NWS are equally crucial. Under Article VI, NWS agreed “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”. In this regard, the NWS have all along contended of having conducted such negotiations and point to the INF Treaty; the START I and START II which provided for significant reductions but not total elimination. Under article II, NNWS are obliged not to transfer any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 13. The 2000 Final Document talks of “an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament”. The Moscow Treaty of 2002 mandated a reduction of deployed nuclear weapons over the next decade, which in effect deferring their abolition for an extended period. While we welcome the Treaty, there is a widely held perception that reductions in deployment and operational status could not substitute the principle of irreversibility and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In this regard, many State Parties expect a positive response to the 13 practical steps, agreed to in 2000. D. How should we address difficult issues, such as security assurances, the Middle East and universality? 14. For NNWS, security assurances represent another critical aspect of the non-proliferation regime. Efforts to diminish the appeal that NNWS may have for nuclear weapons include providing such assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by NWS. For NNWS, they must be broader in scope than the Security Council Resolution 984 (1995) 15. While they welcome the assurances contained therein, they point to its loopholes and escape clauses. More recently, new conditionalities have been attached to withdraw them to states if some NWS unilaterally determine non-compliance with Treaty obligations. For these reasons, a majority of NNWS is committed to a legally binding international convention or a formal treaty containing unconditional and absolute security assurances. 16. The 1995 Principles and Objectives on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, made some progress on this issue by at least recognizing the need for “further steps” in this regard and that “such steps” could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument”. The 2000 document called upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on the issue of negative Security Assurance. It is only natural therefore that large number of states parties expected the upcoming PrepCom to address this issue and that it come up with concrete recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference. 17. Many states and groups of states have been actively involved in seeking a common formula that would command a consensus among the NWS and NNWS. There appears to be some reasonable prospects for reconciling their positions leading to marginal advance. There are indications from many states parties that this could take the form of a protocol to the Treaty. 18. With regard to the Middle East, in terms of WMD threats, things have changed quite significantly. Both the fears and the uncertainties about Iraq’s WMD capabilities and programs have largely been eliminated. Meanwhile, Iran has agreed to suspend enrichment and reprocessing activities, to adhere to the Additional Protocol and to make a full disclosure of its nuclear programme. In addition, Libya has now decided to come clean about its WMD program and to permit their elimination under verification by the IAEA. In the context of the Third Prepcom, one thing that State Parties should do is to arrive at positive pronouncement of such a current state of affairs. 19. The 2000 NPT Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and noted that all states in the region were parties to the NPT, with the exception of Israel and called upon that state to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. Relevant states were also called upon to report to the UN Secretary-General, to the 2005 Review Conference as well as Chairpersons of the Prepcom sessions on the steps taken to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. 20. On the issue of universality, in accordance with the 1995 Decision, the universal adherence to the NPT is an urgent priority. All States not yet party to the Treaty are called upon to accede to the Treaty at the earliest date, particularly those States that operate unsafe guarded nuclear facilities. Every effort should be made by all States parties to achieve this objective. 21. In the 2000 Final Document, the Conference urged all States not yet party to the Treaty, namely, India, Israel and Pakistan, (formerly Cuba was also included) to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon states, promptly and without conditions. For the first time an NPT document mentioned these non-NPT states by name. 22. It also called on them to place all their nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, to strengthen their non-proliferation export control measures over technologies, material and equipment that can be used for the production of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. Their pledge to sign and ratify the CTBT has not yet been fulfilled. It is also unlikely that they will heed the call to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA inspections until other NWS will do so for reasons of equality and reciprocity which they espoused in the past. 23. The question is how we are to engage those states that are outside the Treaty? Indeed, it is a difficult issue for the NPT state parties to address, but this challenge cannot be ignored if the regime is continue to be seen as relevant to the handling of proliferation problems. One of the ways to deal with them, as suggested by Malaysia at the 1999 Prep Com session, high-level consultations can be instituted on an annual basis between representatives of the non-proliferation regime and states outside the NPT. 24. Although the existence of three de facto states outside the NPT is not high on the current non-proliferation agenda, they need to be engaged more fully in the non-proliferation regime in order to maintain the viability of the Treaty. 25. It is widely recognized that export controls with comprehensive safeguards constitute key elements of the non-proliferation regime. At the same time, the importance of transparency in export controls need to be reaffirmed along with the recognition of the right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. E. How we move forward? 26. The consultations that I have conducted so far has made it clear that a large number of states parties consider it important for the 2005 Review Conference to pronounce the urgent need to maintain the balance of the three pillars of the NPT regime. In the context of the implementation of the 1995 and 2000 decisions to strengthen the NPT regime, a number of steps were mentioned. They are, among others, the establishment of a mechanism operating in between two Review Conferences, establishment of a permanent secretariat etc. In addition to these there was also a strong view that the Third Prepcom should address new security challenges including nuclear terrorism, the safety of nuclear installations and materials as well as the emergence of new technologies and their potential for lowering the nuclear threshold. The possibility of nuclear terrorism and combating this menace warrants our serious consideration. As we all are aware, the UN General Assembly has been seized with this issue. It is our duty and responsibility to extend our full support to the finalization of its efforts for a convention. Equally important is the strengthening of IAEA programme for the safe transport of nuclear material, a convention on nuclear terrorism and an assessment of terrorist threats. 27. At the 2005 Review Conference, we will also be faced with numerous other problems, such as non-compliance with the Treaty’s commitments; concerns about the asymmetry in the implementation of disarmament commitments on the one hand, and non-proliferation provisions on the other; whether nuclear disarmament will be dealt with as a priority issue within a multilateral framework; proliferation concerns in the Korean peninsula; and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in the Middle East. 28. In my view, it would indeed be very ideal, if we can move toward the 2005 NPT Review Conference with recommendations that it would consider on the following issues: (a) The maintenance of a moratorium on nuclear testing. (b) World-wide de-alerting of nuclear forces within a specified date to give meaning and substance to the call made in the 2000 document for “concrete, agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems”. (c) The initiation of negotiations between the Russian Federation and the U.S. for the reduction and elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons. (d) Expediting/completing the ratification processes to the Protocols of the Treaties of Bangkok and the Central Asian NWFZ and anticipated progress on the question of the Middle East as a NWFZ. (e) Progress in the demand by the NNWS for legally binding security assurances in the form of an international convention. (f) Substantive reports to be submitted by all states parties as appropriate on all aspects of the Treaty. (g) In the context of ensuring the safety and security of nuclear materials, additional measures are agreed upon to further strengthen the existing ones such as the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the IAEA Action Plan on the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism. (h) Collective commitment by states
parties opposing the granting of any assistance to non-state actors
regarding the acquisition of WMD capabilities. Its corollary would be
a guarantee that at all times all nuclear infrastructure would effectively
be under the control of civilian officials. (j) Determination on how to respond to non-compliance, particularly with a view to induce all State Parties that have not yet completed negotiations with the IAEA for acceding to the Model Additional Protocol. (k) The solution to the problems posed by the DPRK must necessarily be based on the outcome of the six-power negotiations. It is difficult to imagine that the DPRK will defy the international community and resume its suspected weapons program. F. Conclusion 30. These approaches are also indispensable in dealing effectively with the numerous emerging challenges confronting the global community. It is particular so since the dangers posed by nuclear terrorism is trans-national and since terrorist groups have a global reach and focus, multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions offer the most viable strategy. 31. With more actors and more complex new issues, States Parties that will participate in the Third Preparatory Committee’s session and the 2005 Review Conference will have to deal with a wide range of views and interests. The success or failure will depend upon their commitment to the common objective of strengthening the non-proliferation regime in all its aspects. Recognition of each other’s legitimate interests would be an essential pre-requisite for reaching consensus. It is the hope of many that the forthcoming Review Conference will succeed in its endeavors to ensure the efficacy, utility, credibility and thereby longevity of the NPT.
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