Statement

by

H.E. Mr.  Nugroho Wisnumurti

Director-General for Political Affairs

Department of Foreign Affairs

and

Head of Delegation of the Republic of Indonesia

to the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties

To the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

at the Plenary Session 

New York, 26 April 2000

Mr. President,

On behalf of the Indonesian Delegation, I should like to extend our congratulations on your unanimous election to preside over the deliberations of the 2000 Review Conference Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.  We remain fully confident that under your able and wise guidance, our endeavors will lead to a successful conclusion. Our felicitations also go to the other members of the Bureau. 

Mr. President,

The 1995 Decisions of the NPT Review and Extension Conference were widely hailed as forward-looking documents. They enjoined us to undertake a strengthened review process intended to ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of the NPT and the Principles and Objectives for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.  It is pertinent to recall that these envisioned the conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by the year 1996, a fissile material cut-off treaty;  the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones; and above all, “the determined pursuit by the nuclear weapon states of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating these weapons”.  Together, they provided us with the essential infrastructure to facilitate this process and examine substantive issues as a follow-up to those Decisions.

But regrettably, the Preparatory Committee sessions failed to agree on substantive issues due to  the persistence of differences between the nuclear and non-nuclear states particularly over issues relating to nuclear disarmament. They floundered on the meaning, intent and function of the 1995 Decisions.  These in turn have obfuscated our efforts to review the implementation of the Treaty and the Decisions taken at the 1995 Conference.  Hence, our task has been rendered infinitely more difficult to establish a framework for strengthening the review process in order to “promote the full implementation of the Treaty” and for facilitating a more meaningful process of accountability for its implementation that would encompass the full scope of non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. 

In these endeavors, we are no doubt encouraged by the increase in the number of adherents to the NPT since 1995; by the increasing number of states ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, most notably by the Russian Federation; by the consolidation of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones;  by the formulation of guidelines by the United Nations Disarmament Commission to facilitate the establishment of new such zones; and by the ratification of START  II by the Russian Federation. We should also recall the unanimous conclusion reached by the International Court of Justice in 1996 that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion the negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament removed any lingering doubts about the legal obligation incumbent upon the weapons states for the total abolition of these weapons.  These and other positive developments taken together have undoubtedly solidified the NPT. 

But the credibility of the non-proliferation regime has been gravely undermined by a number of retrograde developments. The specter of nuclear war with its potentially devastating consequences remains a frightening possibility. Thousands of nuclear weapons are deployed and on alert status. Negotiations for nuclear weapons reductions are hopelessly deadlocked at a time when dangers posed by these weapons of mass destruction continue to grow. In this context, we cannot fail to note the recent declarations that emphasized the continuing role of nuclear weapons for security and envision the first use of these weapons even against non-nuclear states, which are in stark contrast to the undertakings in the 1995 Principles and Objectives. The nuclear tests conducted in South Asia were a serious setback to the universality of the Treaty and added to the complexity of issues attendant upon non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

Further compounding the situation are the uncertainties surrounding the coming into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.  A vast and multi-faceted effort is underway at modernizing nuclear arsenals to provide for the continued research, development and testing of nuclear weapons well into this century.  The oft-postponed negotiations for a fissile materials cut-off treaty is yet to take off from the ground.  

Meanwhile, the collision course over plans for a missile defense system runs the risk of a renewed nuclear arms race which would diminish the prospects for further nuclear arms reductions and ultimately threatening the NPT itself.  To this, we must add the ominous prospect of the weaponization of outer space with its potentially disastrous consequences; the hair-trigger alert of nuclear weapons even in the post-Cold War era with the attendant prospect of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation; the stationing of land-based nuclear weapons in the territories of non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT which is a gross violation of its relevant provisions; and the updating of strategic doctrines despite their known weaknesses, dangers and fallacies.  The persistence of these outmoded approaches to weapons of mass destruction in utter disregard of the security and even the survival of humanity has contributed to an erosion of confidence in the integrity of the non-proliferation regime. 

Failure to acknowledge this dismal state of affairs will only deepen frustration and thereby further undermine the Treaty.  Hence, it is critically important to reverse the growing perception that the Treaty is of dubious value or even inimical to the fundamental interests of the majority and has become an instrument for promoting the interests of a handful of states. 

It is therefore clear, Mr.  President, that a myriad of substantive issues will have to be resolved to ensure the success of this review exercise. We are mandated to examine them in order to build upon the Decisions of the 1995 Conference.  We remain convinced that states parties would make every endeavor to utilize the opportunity now available with vision and foresight.  An agreed package of decisions along with implementable mechanisms for a genuine and phased program of nuclear disarmament, binding security assurances and meaningful assistance for peaceful activities would further the objectives of the Treaty.  These areas of contention and discord must be addressed if we are to avert a dismal failure and its repercussions for the future of the Treaty.  Hence, the final document that we may adopt should candidly address what can and should be accomplished within the time-frame of the years 2000-2005, that is, to “look forward”. 

In my delegation’s view, these would include, inter alia, the ratification of the CTBT by all the 44 states identified therein to be accompanied by the termination of sub-critical tests designed to modernize and improve nuclear weapons systems which are contrary to the goals of the CTBT and the NPT.  The future credibility of the CTBT may well hinge on how effectively it will be implemented by those who are committed to pursue it. 

Indonesia believes that the objective of a ban on fissile materials set in 1995 can be achieved and we should be able to make progress in resolving this question.  But it has to be viewed as a modality to stem both vertical and horizontal proliferation and pursued in the context of an agenda to “rollback” existing arsenals, and on the basis of a non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty. 

It is now widely recognized that attempts to revise or modify the ABM Treaty through the deployment of a missile defense system would be tantamount to its abrogation, precipitate a strategic modernization program and undermine regional and global security.  These dire prospects call for the reaffirmation of its integrity and importance. 

These measures should be buttressed, among others, by concrete steps to reduce nuclear dangers such as de-alerting of all nuclear weapons and the de-coupling of all nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles; by the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons; by the adoption of measures for transparency in nuclear and related issues; by the termination of plans and programs for the weaponization of outer space; and by the commencement of negotiations on START III leading to significantly deeper reductions. 

Despite the global implications of nuclear weapons, the continued exclusion of non-nuclear weapon states from the ambit of decision-making on nuclear disarmament issues and the ensuing strategic subordination of this vast majority is no longer tenable.  Nuclear disarmament has been and will continue to be a pre-occupation of the international community.  States which have renounced nuclear weapons have a legitimate interest in the pace and progress of nuclear disarmament negotiations.  It is therefore imperative that the unique role of the Conference on Disarmament must be acknowledged in the negotiations for a nuclear weapons convention. 

In my delegation’s view, these are modest, realistic and achievable steps in the interim that can preserve the NPT, reinforce its fundamental goals and stem the dangerous arms race that looms on the horizon.  Their implementation would also be a litmus test of the sincerity of the nuclear weapon states to live up to the commitments undertaken in Article VI of the Treaty and the 1995 Decisions.

As far as security assurances are concerned, Mr. President, unilateral pledges such as those contained in Security Council Resolution 984 (1995) do not by themselves create the necessary confidence that nuclear weapons will not be used.  Such declarations leave ample room for subjective interpretations.  There is also the danger that under certain circumstances, especially after the initiation of hostilities, such assurances may be unilaterally withdrawn.  And they do not meet the security imperatives of the non-nuclear states as they had not been multilaterally negotiated, and hence, non-binding.  As security can never be assured on the basis of hortatory declarations, security guarantees in a binding international convention without any loopholes is a legitimate right of all non-nuclear states parties to the Treaty.  For without such iron-clad guarantees, these states would remain under the threat or actual use of nuclear weapons and are therefore committed to a common formulation incorporated into a legal instrument. 

The 1995 Principles and Objectives made a modicum of progress on this issue by recognizing the need for “further steps” in this regard and that “such steps could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument” and thereby acknowledged the legitimacy of the position taken by the non-nuclear-weapon states for security assurances.  The improved international political atmosphere in the post-Cold War era coupled with greater military openness and transparency has provided a qualitative new environment for a fresh appraisal of this question.  Its successful outcome could further strengthen the non-proliferation regime and also constitute an important step in the broader process of nuclear disarmament. 

As one of the early proponents of nuclear-weapon-free zones, Indonesia is gratified that substantive progress has been made since 1995 to establish these zones as a number of countries and regions have decided to pursue this goal which attest to the reality of their pre-eminence in contemporary disarmament agenda.  They also bear testimony to their multiple roles in stemming proliferation, in promoting a stable security environment and in ensuring that their regions are free from the menace posed by nuclear arsenals.  Support for the Bangkok and Pelindaba Treaties and their Protocols as well as for the establishment of new such zones in North and Central Asia and in the Middle East would confirm the irreversible process of a globalized nuclear-weapons-free world. 

With regard to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the 1995 Decision reaffirmed the validity of Article IV of the NPT and the inalienable right of all states parties to unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear materials and technology to the developing countries.  The new supply arrangements are to be conditional upon a commitment to the IAEAs full-scope safeguards.  It also stressed the importance of transparency in nuclear-related export controls.  As this question continues to be divisive, the participation of more states in these regimes, which were created outside the NPT framework, would clarify the issues involved in dual-purpose technologies and dispel the widely-held belief that their objectives go beyond proliferation concerns and impinge upon the decision-making prerogatives of the recipient countries. 

The Additional Protocol to strengthen IAEA safeguards has gained an increasing number of adherents including Indonesia.  Concurrently, our attention is drawn to the perennial question of lack of funding for the Agency’s program to further strengthen technical cooperation. While funds for these activities have decreased, those for safeguards have increased. Progress on these issues together with transparency in nuclear-related export controls will provide meaning and substance to the relevant Articles of the Treaty. 

Finally, the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East constitutes an integral part of the three Decisions taken at that time and reflects the continuing endeavors of the international community to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in that volatile region.  Since its adoption, three other states in the region have acceded to the Treaty.  The only stumbling block to its implementation is the steadfast refusal by one country in the region to accede to the NPT and to place all its nuclear facilities under  IAEAs  full-scope safeguards. 

In this regard, the depository states as co-sponsors of that Resolution have a special responsibility to ensure its implementation which would bring the NPT closer to universality and to its further strengthening. To facilitate these endeavors, my delegation welcomes the establishment of subsidiary body 2 under Main Committee II of this Conference to identify the steps required for the adherence of all states in the Middle East to the NPT.

In conclusion, Mr. President, Indonesia agrees with the widely-held view that the NPT’s objectives encompass non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, and hence, inseparable.  Both these objectives are inextricably inter-linked.  Hence, we cannot promote the non-proliferation regime while undermining nuclear disarmament. What is at stake is the sanctity of the Treaty which cannot be subject to casuistic interpretations.  The integrity and  longevity of the Treaty cannot be sustained in the absence of significant and irreversible steps towards the total elimination of nuclear arsenals.  The alternative will be further proliferation in the new millennium leading to the eventual collapse of the non-proliferation regime.  The Treaty’s near universality and its indefinite duration should not blind us to its internal contradictions, discriminatory nature and unkept promises with their potential for its unraveling. 

As the Non-Aligned Movement has stated, there is no justification for the maintenance of nuclear arsenals or the security of a handful of powerful countries based on deterrence.  Neither there is any justification for the insistence that nuclear weapons provide unique security benefits and continue to monopolize them while pursuing the non-proliferation objective.  At its Twelfth Summit Meeting held in Durban in 1998, the Movement has proposed the creation of an open-ended inter-sessional standing committee to implement the obligations undertaken in the NPT.  In NAM’s view, such an approach would make a significant contribution in strengthening the regime which is one of the objectives incorporated in the 1995 Decisions. 

The NPT is at a cross-roads.  While reviewing the past and looking to the future, we find ourselves still faced with the lofty mission of achieving the objectives set forth in the Treaty.  Indonesia is ready to contribute, along with other states parties its unremitting efforts and cooperation for this purpose. 

I thank you, Mr. President.