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Statement New York, 5 October 2005 Mr. Chairman, I should like, on behalf of my delegation, to extend my delegation’s congratulations to you on your unanimous election to the Chairmanship of the First Committee and to the other members of the Bureau. Mr. Chairman, The past year has witnessed a deepening crisis in our endeavors to effectively address issues relating to arms control, disarmament and international security. Narrow self-interest and exacerbated unilateralism have weakened multilateral forums which were specifically established to deal with those issues. My delegation shares a deep frustration over the failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference held last May to adopt any substantive recommendations that would demonstrate a resounding commitment to the three pillars of the Treaty – non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It has not escaped our attention that for the first time in NPT’s history, this Review Conference was bogged down from the start in wrangling over the agenda and the program of work among its Main Committees. These deeply disturbing developments were further compounded by the omission of any reference to non-proliferation and disarmament in the historic document adopted by the High-Level Panel Meeting held last month. My delegation shares the UN Secretary-General’s characterization of such an omission as “inexcusable” and that “weapons of mass destruction pose a grave danger to us all”. It is noteworthy that at the UN Summit recently, the nuclear-weapon-States, as they did at the NPT Review Conference, rejected any reference in the Summit document to disarmament obligations under the NPT. This opened the door for other States to jump into the negotiations of the document with their own amendments and objections. In the view of my delegation, and I think the view of many member states, these developments will make it more difficult to revive the existing stalemate in the field of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Even worse, it has made it more difficult to persuade other states to foreclose their nuclear options as long as the nuclear-weapon-States insist on maintaining and even improving theirs. Mr. Chairman, We should also add to these pessimistic developments our concern over the deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament, divisiveness in the First Committee and the impasse in the Disarmament Commission – all due primarily to the lack of political will, particularly from the nuclear-weapon-States. Taken together, these developments have created a grave crisis in multilateral diplomacy on disarmament. Sometime ago, the Secretary-General warned us of a rust in disarmament diplomacy and underlined the need for concerted efforts to bridge existing differences over key issues on the disarmament agenda under multilateral auspices. Therefore, we should continue our efforts to gather support and new consensus for further action on these vital issues. In confronting the challenges of insecurity and instability, Indonesia has begun the task of building cooperation across the Indian Ocean. The Asian-African Summit Meeting held in Jakarta last April has formalized various channels for such cooperation. Its Declaration on Strategic Partnership is pragmatic and forward-looking and will serve as a bridge over the two continents. Of particular significance is the commitment of this Partnership to strive for multilateralism and a central role for the United Nations in global affairs. Thus, it highlights the importance of dialogue among nations to address issues of common concern such as armed conflict, transnational crimes, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Along the same direction, Indonesia also joined the Seven Nations Ministerial Declaration initiated by Norway. It was clear that this initiative, which came from different regions and represents different views, is intended to find a pragmatic way forward to get out of the present impasse with regard to global non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. Mr. Chairman, Against this backdrop, the problem of compliance with global arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties has been the most severe. The twin crisis of compliance with NPT obligations, coupled with the failure of the nuclear weapon states to take concrete, verifiable and irreversible steps to eliminate their arsenals, have led to a crisis of confidence in the NPT regime. No issue demonstrates unambiguously the crisis surrounding the NPT than the fate of the Comprehensive-Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT). Although it is approaching universality with 176 signatories and 125 ratifications, the CTBT has continued to languish due to the refusal of some of the nuclear weapon states to adhere to the Treaty. This is incompatible with the successful conclusion of the Fourth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT held last month. Negotiations without conditions on a verifiable fissile materials cut-off treaty (FMCT), focusing attention both on existing stocks and future production of weapons usable materials – whether civil or military, is very pertinent. The urgency for stricter protection of fissile materials calls attention to the need for the successful conclusion of such negotiations without further delay. As universally acknowledged, the world today remains in peril of a threat that comes from the continued existence and unabated growth of nuclear arsenals. The only credible response to this threat is the total abolition of these arsenals. In this regard, security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in a legally binding international convention without conditions or loopholes have become imperative. As regards the IAEA, we should endeavor to strengthen its role in assisting developing countries to unimpeded and assured access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. At the same time, we should ensure the non-diversion of nuclear materials; address the growing concern over the proliferation of nuclear materials, assistance and technology through clandestine sources as well as widespread alarm about the possibility of nuclear terrorism and their potential for lowering the nuclear threshold. In responding to these compelling realities, we call all States for the further strengthening of the Agency’s integrated comprehensive safeguards system and greater adherence to the Additional Protocol. As far as nuclear-weapon-free-zones are concerned, as a State party to the Bangkok Treaty, we will continue to seek adherence to its Protocol by the nuclear weapon states whose cooperation, recognition and support for the zone is an essential pre-requisite to ensure its effectiveness. We remain hopeful that outstanding issues will be resolved with a sense of urgency that will reinforce regional security, prevent proliferation and advance the cause of nuclear disarmament. Sharing common objectives and aspirations, the entire Southern Hemisphere has become a vast nuclear-free-zone with over 100 states joined together through regional Treaties and their Protocols to ban nuclear weapons from their areas. In this context, my delegation is gratified to note that significant progress has been made by the five Central Asian states to establish a nuclear-weapon-free-zone. We hope that the on-going endeavors will continue to be supported by the states concerned leading to the strengthening of peace and security at both the regional and global levels. We also urge all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in the Middle East. With regard to the DPRK’s, we are encouraged by the Statement of Principles signed last month during the six-party talks that could lead to a diplomatic and peaceful solution including that state rejoining the NPT and readmitting inspectors from the IAEA. My delegation has consistently taken the position that seeking a peaceful settlement to this complex problem through dialogue is an essential pre-requisite for ensuring peace and stability in North-East Asia and for the establishment of a nuclear-free-zone in the Korean Peninsula. Mr. Chairman, For a number of years, an overwhelming majority of member states have voted for the convening of the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament (SSOD IV) for well-founded reasons. The only consensus document we have is the Final Document adopted by SSOD I in 1978. Since that time, numerous international conferences on issues of global concern and interest have been held and they took decisions which paved the way for multilateral solutions. Disarmament is yet to find its place in this on-going process. In my delegation’s view, the convening of SSOD IV is the only viable alternative to our collective predicament. It offers invaluable opportunities for multilateral negotiations on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. It holds enormous potential to not only promote the disarmament agenda, but also to review the multilateral disarmament machinery. On the issue of small arms and light weapons, we welcome the adoption of an international instrument to regulate marking and tracing of illicit transfer of SALW as an important achievement in our efforts to implement the Program of Action. At the Second Biennial Meeting held last July, it was clear that member states have made significant progress at the national, regional and global levels in dealing with the scourge of illicit trade and they recognized the need for further action to fulfill the commitments undertaken in the Program of Action. We also look forward to the First Review Conference scheduled next year to follow-up and address a number of pertinent issues especially the modalities for enhancing international cooperation. Finally, as mandated by resolution 59/95, it is now widely acknowledged that the First Committee should undergo a rationalization of its methods of work to further facilitate our endeavors in addressing disarmament and security issues. We agree that we have to take a closer look at its procedures so that this forum can be better structured to deal with these issues in a more constructive and inclusive manner. However, such an approach should include not only procedural aspects but also substantive questions in the context of SSOD IV. This will ensure comprehensive and long term solution to disarmament and security issues under multilateral auspices. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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