A Paper submitted by

Andy Rachmianto
First Secretary
Permanent Mission of Indonesia
to the United Nations
New York
at
The Sixth United Nations Conference
on Disarmament Issues:
The United Nations
After Six Decades and Renewed Efforts for
the Promotion of Disarmament

Kyoto, Japan 17 – 19 August 2005


INTRODUCTION

The goal of nuclear disarmament has long eluded the international community. The expectation of progress towards that goal has not been fulfilled. There is a widely shared perception of concerted efforts by the nuclear-weapon-states to diminish the significance of the legal obligation contained in Article VI of the NPT which came into force in 1970 and the political agreements reached in 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences.

At the 2005 NPT Review Conference, the objective of nuclear disarmament was repudiated or contentions that it has become irrelevant. In fact, one of the nuclear-weapon-states has clearly mentioned that “nuclear disarmament was no longer exists” and asserted that the 13 practical steps of the 2000 Final Document has become a “historical document”.

PRINCIPLES, OBJECTIVES AND OBLIGATIONS ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference adopted the “Principles and Objectives for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”. It contained provisions for “the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon-states of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal(s) of eliminating these weapons”.

On 8 July 1996, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory opinion on “the Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons”, which among others, stated that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

More significantly, the 2000 NPT Review Conference adopted a Final Document contained a specific political commitment of an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon-states to accomplish the total elimination of their arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament. It was reinforced by the inclusion of 13 practical steps which constitute a road map to implement Article VI of the NPT and the consensus agreement of 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

The NPT has enjoined non-nuclear-weapon-states to refrain from the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The proliferation of nuclear weapons has been effectively contained as nearly all non-nuclear-weapon states have fulfilled their commitments by renouncing the nuclear option.

Hence, adhering to both ends of the central bargain under the NPT, namely, non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, is critical for the survival of the NPT. And it would be unfair and untenable to demand the non-nuclear-weapon-states to comply with their obligations, while the nuclear-weapon-states have failed to live up to their obligations and commitments.

While non-proliferation objectives are backed by stringent enforcement and verification measures, so should the Treaty’s disarmament commitments. A failure to deal with this issue through the creation of extra NPT mechanisms runs the risk of NPT becoming irrelevant and ultimately leading to its demise.

Thirty five years after the NPT came into force and fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, the non-nuclear-weapon-states generally share the view that the nuclear-weapon-states do not intend to fulfill their obligations, and indeed, are intent upon retaining their arsenals indefinitely or even developing new type of nuclear weapons, such as nuclear robust earth penetrator (NREP) or the so-called “mini-nukes”.

PRELIMINARY STEPS TO BE UNDERTAKEN

According to a study by the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies on the review of the implementation of obligations, undertakings and commitments of the 1995 and the 2000 Review Conferences, it was concluded that the international community has done more to implement the provisions of nuclear non-proliferation rather than to nuclear disarmament.

The followings are some positive developments with regard to the implementation of non-proliferation provisions:

  • The IAEA as the competent authority has conducted its responsibility to verify and assure, in accordance with its Statute, compliance with its safeguards agreements with States parties undertaken in fulfillment of their obligations under Article III;
  • The effectiveness of IAEA safeguards have been assessed and evaluated leading to the implementation of the comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSA) and the Model Additional Protocol (MAP). There are only 37 states parties of the NPT that have not yet brought into force a CSA with the IAEA and 102 state parties have signed the MAP;
  • Regardless of its status, the DPRK was not brought into compliance with its treaty obligations. Libya announced that it gave up its nuclear weapons aspirations and has since come into compliance;
  • Over the past three years, the IAEA has been engaged with Iran to ensure its full compliance due to the discovery of its undeclared enrichment facility;
  • In order to enhance cooperation and to seek solution to all concern in the field of non-proliferation issues, a number of initiatives have been taken such as Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR), the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Security Council Resolution 1540;
Meanwhile, some negative developments relates to nuclear disarmament that would substantiate such an argument are among others:
  • Nuclear weapons in their thousands are retained, many on alert status along with the attendant risk of accidental or unauthorized use which undeniably constitute a frightening possibility;
  • The unilateral declaration of national security interests based on re-legitimization of nuclear weapons in the security strategies/doctrines of some nuclear-weapon-states will create another nuclear arms race and nuclear deterrence;
  • There has been systematic attempts to de-link non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament which the 2000 Final Document held as “mutually reinforcing” with an exclusive focus on the former, thereby exacerbating discrimination and unsustainable double standards;
  • The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty which was opened for signature and ratification in 1996 has not yet entered into force. The longer it is delayed, the more likely that testing will resume and become a major set back in the efforts to constrain the qualitative improvement of weapons and the development of new types of weapons.
  • The resumption of negotiations on a fissile materials cut-off treaty is yet to get off the ground although it constitutes the next vital step in the multilateral disarmament agenda. Its conclusion has been frustrated by the imposition of untenable pre-conditions relating to verification.
  • The Moscow Treaty of 2002 contains no commitment either to destroy or to render unusable weapons that are no longer operationally deployed. Unfortunately, reductions in deployment and in operational status can not substitute for irreversible cuts in and the total elimination of nuclear weapons;
  • The abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) has led to negative implications for the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defense systems and the pursuit of advanced military technologies capable of deployment in outer space;
  • The question of non-strategic nuclear weapons continues to be of concern due to their portability and ability to station them in close proximity to areas of conflict which make them susceptible to use in combat, the high probability of pre-delegation of authority to use in the event of conflict, and of an early, pre-emptive, unauthorized or accidental use;

These negative developments have led to the inevitable conclusion by many policy-makers and analysts of a broken promises relating to the reduction and elimination of nuclear armaments. Hence, the focus of attention of the 2005 NPT Review Conference was the issue of nuclear disarmament due to asymmetric compliance with that Treaty’s obligations by the nuclear-weapon-states.

  • Prior to the initiation of substantive nuclear disarmament measures, certain preliminary steps need to be taken:
    The role of nuclear weapons in security strategies need to be de-legitimized and existing nuclear doctrines abandoned. Otherwise, there will always be a threat of a resumption of the nuclear arms race and an escalation of the nuclear threat.
  • The basic position of the international community, particularly non-nuclear-weapon-states, should be non-discriminatory and seek the security of all nations through total nuclear disarmament under a time-bound framework. The continued existence of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to international security and pending their total elimination, a multilaterally agreed instrument on the prohibition, the use or threat of use of such weapons has become imperative.
  • The total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee that there will be no use or threat of use of such weapons. However, the development on new types of nuclear weapons contravened the security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon-states at the time of the conclusion of the CTBT. Therefore, negotiations of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances has become paramount important and timely.
  • Compounding the situation has been the broader role assigned for these weapons which has given added urgency to the concerns of non-nuclear-weapon-states. Hence, there is rationale for a diminishing role for nuclear weapons as an interim measure pending their total elimination.
  • Nuclear-related information on weapons capabilities, deployment and implementation of agreements constitute an essential pre-requisite for accountability and effective verification. Thus, the vital importance of transparency and accountability by which non-nuclear-weapon-states mark progress in this field remains to be recognized through the implementation of regular reporting and the proposal for a Register of Nuclear Weapons—similar to the UN Register of Conventional Arms.
Based on the aforementioned, it is possible to argue that these are realistic and achievable steps whose implementation will render nuclear weapons programs and strategic rivalries obsolete, bolster the non-proliferation regime, pave the way for nuclear disarmament and ensure a stable international security environment.

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AT THE 2005 REVIEW CONFERENCE

The gap between the positions of the have and have-not had begun prior to the 2005 Review Conference (Revcon). When the Third Prepcom was held in 2004, the nuclear-weapon-states claimed that NPT priorities should be directed to stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons. While the problem of their own compliance with Article VI, as stated by one delegation, was no longer exist.

The Chairman of the Prepcom, Ambassador Sudjadnan Parnohadiningrat, tried to have its Summary annexed to the Report of the Prepcom and to provide a simple paragraph which would at least become an agenda for the 2005 Revcon, but one delegation even refused this last resort. This has finally created problems to the President of the Conference, Ambassador Sergio Duarte. Despite his tireless efforts by visiting all the major capitals and participating in a number of workshops to secure agreement on an agenda for the 2005 Revcon, the Conference was opened without having an agenda.
The 2005 NPT Revcon was ended in disarray because it failed to agree on any substantive item and showed the deep fracture in the international community on nuclear weapons. For the first time in history, the Revcon bogged down from the start in wrangling over the agenda and the programme of work among its Committees.

There are several reasons why the Conference failed, but the major cause was the unbalanced emphasis on non-proliferation of nuclear weapon to the total exclusion of nuclear disarmament. While some others said that rather than the failure of the NPT itself, the failure of the Conference was due to the efforts of a few states, which incorrectly believed a failed Conference to be in their best interests.

The followings are an illustration on what was transpired with regard to the nuclear disarmament during the Revcon:

  • The United States blocked any reference to the commitments made by the nuclear-weapon-states at the 1995 and 2000 Conferences. Even more the P-5 could not agree among themselves and failed to issue their joint statement, when the US refused to mention any reference to the CTBT.
  • The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) was not as strong and united as it was in the 2000 Revcon, because of diverging views within the Coalition on how vigorously to pursue nuclear disarmament.
  • The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) state parties to the NPT continued to maintain its basic premise that the continued existence of nuclear weapon constitute a threat to humanity and therefore urged the nuclear-weapon-states to fulfill the commitment undertaken in the NPT, as well as in 1995 and 2000 for the total elimination of nuclear weapon, and in this regard, called for negotiations without delay.
  • The Main Committee I as nuclear disarmament committee, had only conducted four meetings and two meeting of its subsidiary body. However, the only matter of substance to make it through the procedural obstacle was the Working Paper of the Chairman of Main Committee I and the Chairman of the subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament and security assurances.
  • Despite the deliberations in the Main Committee I, and its subsidiary body, were characterized by disagreements over most of all its substantive issues as contained in the working papers, by the end, the Committee agreed to annex the papers to its procedural report.
  • While a procedural report void of any substantive recommendations may not sound like success, but when compared to the work of the other two Main Committees, Main Committee I registered a resounding diplomatic triumph and emerged as the “strongest success story”, at least from the point of view of a New York-based disarmament NGO.
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND THE DISARMAMENT MACHINERY

As noted above, the commitments undertaken in the NPT have not been fully implemented, the CTBT has not entered into force and negotiations for a fissile materials cut-off treaty have not been resumed. Underlying the crisis relating to nuclear disarmament was the paralysis in multilateral disarmament machinery that was consciously built for almost three decades.

This has been reflected by the deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), divisiveness in the First Committee and criticism of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC). Such marginalization has setback the efforts by an overwhelming majority of non-nuclear-weapon-states to achieve general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

In a statement to introduce his Report “In Larger Freedom”, the UN Secretary-General has stated “that the disarmament machinery in danger of erosion, therefore, they must be revitalized to ensure continued progress on disarmament and to address the growing risk of a cascade of proliferation, especially in the nuclear field”.
For the last few years, the debate in the field of disarmament focused on process rather than substance and many so-called decisions simply reflect the lowest common denominator of widely different opinions. For example, the CD has not been able to agree on programmed of work. The UNDC did not have substantive session this year and in 2004, because the Commission can not reach agreement on the agenda items. And the latest one was the 2005 NPT Revcon which failed because it wiggled with the issues of agenda and the programme of work during most of the time allocated to its substantive sessions.

The crux of the problems facing the international disarmament machinery rests entirely with the capitals, which have yet to exert the necessary political will to implements agreements already reached or take steps to reach new agreements to provide security for the people of the world.

Therefore, multilateralism should become the basis for this dialogue between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon-states. With so much of our disarmament machinery deadlocked to the point of paralysis, an increasing number of States, particularly from the NAM, are considering the notion of returning to the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD).
The only consensus document that we have is the Final Document adopted by SSOD-I in 1978, which inter-alia, has clearly stated that “nuclear disarmament and the elimination of other weapons of mass destruction remains the highest priority and the principal task of our time”. Since that time, a number of international conferences on issues of global concern and interest, such as children, women and HIV/AIDS, have been held and took decisions which paved the way for multilateral solutions. However, disarmament is yet to find its place in this on-going process.
For quite sometime now, UN member states have adopted without a vote in the General Assembly a resolution for the convening of SSOD IV as the only viable alternative to our collective efforts. It offers invaluable opportunities for multilateral negotiations on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Through SSOD-IV, we could address not only the whole agenda of disarmament, but also dealing comprehensively with the real reform of the disarmament machinery (CD, UNDC, First Committee) and to avoid a piecemeal approach on this matter.
Although no consensus was reached at the last substantive session of Open-ended Working Group on SSOD-IV in 2003, as mandated by resolution 59/71 in 2004, the Working Group will resume its session in 2006 to consider “the objective and agenda”, including the possible establishment of the preparatory committee, for the SSOD-IV.

CONCLUSION
  • The continued existence of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to all humanity and their use would have catastrophic consequences for life on Earth. Hence, there is a compelling need to take appropriate steps towards the priority objective of the total elimination of such weapons. Yet, this objective of permanently abolishing these horrific weapons requires the political will of nuclear weapon states.
  • The NPT constitutes an essential legal instrument for nuclear disarmament and its Article VI remains valid. It is an integral part of the NPT bargain and should not to be treated as a peripheral issue by the nuclear-weapon-states. The consensus political agreements of 1995 and 2000 must be implemented in an incremental ways. The nuclear-weapon-states must address the disarmament issue more directly than they have in the past. Most critically, the issue of nuclear disarmament must be taken more seriously.
  • The nuclear-weapon-states need to set an example and pave the way for nuclear disarmament. They should begin by re-committing themselves to the total elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-frame and in an irreversible manner. Then they should identity concrete steps to reduce the nuclear threats and also identify nuclear disarmament measures which they could take unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally.
  • We must continue to explore possibilities for advancing the dialogue on disarmament and non-proliferation, so that the groundwork will have been ready when the real action begins. Therefore, multilateral disarmament machinery should be revitalized in a comprehensive, inclusive and transparent manner, among others, through the convening of the SSOD-IV.
  • And in this regard, in accordance with its Charter, the UN has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. In order to discharge its function effectively, the UN should facilitate and encourage all disarmament measures through unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral efforts. While the world is watching the UN Reform as a center stage, this is the historic moment we must seize to break down the barriers in disarmament machinery. [END]