Intervention
by the Delegation of Indonesia
at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for
the 2005 NPT Review Conference

New York, 3 May 2004
O n Security Assurances

Mr. Chairman,

The concerns of the vulnerability of non-nuclear weapon States, particularly parties to the NPT, from the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons have been aired for a long time. Such apprehensions were heightened by the development of new types of nuclear weapons and the adoption of new strategic doctrines, which include the possible use of those weapons against non-nuclear weapon States. Therefore, Indonesia has always attached great importance to the issue of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of these horrendous weapons.

My Delegation recognizes that since 1978, the nuclear weapon States had declared their commitment - and some recognized it as an obligation - not to resort to use or threat of use of their nuclear weapons against non nuclear weapon Sates and also nuclear weapon free zones. We also recall that in 1995, the UN Security Council had adopted Resolution 984 which extended security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States. To some extent, it contributed to ease the widely felt concerns and to a certain degree to the promotion of international security and stability.

However, my Delegation is of the firm conviction that they are far from the legitimate expectation and aspiration of the vast majority of international community. They fall short of providing adequate security assurances since they were not multilaterally negotiated and therefore did not offer reasonable and binding assurances to meet the valid and long -standing demand of non nuclear weapon States. Furthermore, we believe that international security can never be assured on the basis of unilateral declarations and non-binding commitments. To be credible, such assurances must be reinforced by a firm commitment to non-use of nuclear weapons and renunciation of strategic doctrines.

The demand for a multilateral legally binding instrument to ensure security is fully consistent with the 1978 Final Document of SSOD I and in accordance with the resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly since 1979 which emphasized the urgency of seeking an international agreement to assure the non nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The 1995 Principles and Objectives for non-proliferation and disarmament further stated that steps should be considered and these could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument. This consensus was further reinforced in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference which agreed that legally binding security assurances by nuclear weapon States would strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

For these overwhelming reasons, we need more than mere verbal commitments and declarations. My Delegation firmly believe that the most effective guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is the total abolition of these arsenals under strict and effective international control. Pending the attainment of that objective, negative security assurances has become imperative.

A multilaterally negotiated legally binding convention on security assurances would bring positive signals to the international community on the serious commitment by the nuclear weapon States to live up to their obligations and also provide an incentive to those who remain outside to accede to the NPT. The coming into force of such a convention could significantly strengthen the non-proliferation regime, but for sure, it would constitute an important step in the broader process of nuclear disarmament; a process we look forward to achieving in the not too distant future.

Considering the numerous important factors that my Delegation has mentioned, it is reasonable to expect that this Prepcom session will produce concrete proposal for consideration by the 2005 Review Conference.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.