Statement by H.E. Dr. R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa
Mr. President, I should like to begin, Mr. President, by thanking the co-sponsors for their diligence and outreach in consulting Security Council member states on the draft resolution before us today. Before going further, permit me to reiterate Indonesia’s principled position with regard to the issue before the Council. First, Indonesia underscores the imperative to find a peaceful solution to any question related to nuclear non-proliferation. Second, any solution must be guided by the need to protect the integrity of multilateral arrangement, particularly the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which is fundamentally based upon three main pillars, namely: non-proliferation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and nuclear disarmament. Finally, it is a matter of fact that state’s
effort to exercise its inalienable rights of peaceful uses of nuclear
energy is bordering with proliferation aspect. In this regard, Indonesia
has full confidence in the credibility, independence and efficiency
of the IAEA as the sole, competent authority for the verification
of the respective safeguard obligations of Member States. In determining the right course of action with regard to the issue under discussion, Indonesia has been guided by the important information contained in the latest report of the Director General of IAEA issued on 22 February 2008, which revealed several key findings. Indonesia appreciates Iran for its efforts to show greater cooperation, and at the same time, more transparency, to the Agency. Hence, the Agency has been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. In addition, the report stated that the Agency’s knowledge about Iran’s current declared nuclear program has become clearer due to Iran’s provision of information similar to which it had provided pursuant to the Additional Protocol. Furthermore, Iran has provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material and has provided the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and activities. Mr. President, We have carefully considered both the report and the draft resolution before the Council today. With regard to the outstanding issues, we note that the Agency considered that all remaining outstanding issues contained in the work plan, with the exception of one issue, have been resolved. The report stated that contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities and in addition has started the development of new generation centrifuges and continued construction of the IR-40 reactor of the Heavy Water Production. For the remaining one issue, that is alleged weaponization studies, the report of the IAEA clearly noted that the Agency has not detected the use of nuclear material. However, the report also stated that the Agency is not yet in a position to determine the full nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. It implies that some specific demands as stipulated in Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) have not been met. However, it is important to note that notable progress have been made in resolving the outstanding issues between Iran and the IAEA as demanded by those resolutions. Mr. President, We have been keen to ensure that there is synergy and complementary between the report and the IAEA efforts generally, on the one hand, and the letter and spirit of the draft resolution, on the other. We cannot fail to note the well calibrated nature of the report – recognizing important progress in its cooperation with the Agency as well as the facts of Iran’s lack of compliance with Security Council resolutions. It depicts well the complexity and the mixed picture of the issue. It has been our expectation that the draft resolution would reflect this complex dynamics and mixed findings, and not to succumb to an overly one dimensional characterization of where we are today. We note that the additional sanctions in the present draft have been described as being incremental, targeted at non-proliferation areas and reversible; that the Council would suspend its implementation should Iran curtail all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA. Mr. President, Indonesia remains to be convinced of the efficacy of adopting additional sanctions at this juncture. Essentially, we are not convinced whether more sanctions, however incremental, well targeted and reversible, would move us forward in resolving the question of Iran’s nuclear programme, or whether it will only give potential negative impact at a time when progress is being made. We wonder, Mr. President, whether more sanctions at this juncture is the most sensible approach. We need to pose the question whether more sanction is the most sensible course of action to instill confidence, trust and engender cooperation between all the parties concerned. It is our belief that ultimately, lack of confidence and trust lies at the heart of the matter. We must avoid more of the same. Mr. President, It is our expectation that Iran will continue to engage actively with the Agency in order to build confidence about the scope and nature of its nuclear program. Such development is not without relevance to our deliberation today. After all, the Iran dossier was referred to the Council to encourage that country to resolve outstanding verification issues with the IAEA and restore international community’s confidence in its nuclear programme. While yet to be completed, this has begun and is making progress. The suspension of enrichment related activities is an instrument. It is a means to an end. It is not, as we understand it, an end by itself, isolated from developments in Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA. The IAEA-Iran work plan constitutes a platform to restore the confidence of the international community. Any interruption to this confidence-building process will only threaten to unravel the important gains that have been made. Mr. President, In order to put an end to this cycle, it is imperative for all of us to move forward and in a more creative and constructive manner. We must revive and renew the initiative to establish a multilateral arrangement, as part and parcel of the NPT, to guarantee the security of supply of nuclear technology and materials, including highly enriched uranium. Such an arrangement would provide certainty, as well
as assurance, to Iran, and eventually put an end to the existing suspicions.
Thus, removing any reason for anyone to question the peaceful nature
of Iran’s current enrichment process. Mr. President, We are aware that Security Council resolution 1747 provides for the possibility of further appropriate measures in the event of Iranian non-compliance. There is, however, nothing automatic about such measures – further decisions will be needed. Above all, it is important to recognize that the conditions prevailing today are different to that on the eve of the adoption of Security Council resolutions 1747. The strategic goals of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) are being achieved. Iran is cooperating with the IAEA. At this juncture, more sanctions are not the best course. For those considerations and reasons, Mr. President, Indonesia will vote abstention on the draft resolution before us today. Thank you
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