Statement by New York, 22 April 2005
Allow me to express the appreciation of my delegation to you as the Facilitator for convening these thematic consultations under Cluster II: “Freedom from Fear.” It is our belief that this commendable effort will enrich our input into the report of the Secretary-General in the preparation for the High-Level Plenary in September. In this connection, my delegation associates with the statement already made by Malaysia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Indonesia shares the view that the Millennium Declaration provides a clear, 21st century perspective of the balance between peace and security, and between economic and social development that The Charter of the United Nations outlined in its purposes and principles. We believe that the threats that the world faces today are interconnected, and must thus be collectively addressed. To that extent, we believe that the United Nations, as the world’s primary and pre-eminent multilateral instrument, remains the only collective organ for addressing those threats, and that States should avoid unilateral activity capable of upsetting this multilateral umbrella. My delegation appreciates the concern of the Secretary-General on this subject, and therefore commends his invitation of Heads of State and Government to affirm and commit to a new security consensus in the 21st century. We share the view that no State can protect itself acting entirely alone, and that all States need an equitable, efficient and effective collective security system. Mr. Facilitator, With reference to the subject of weapons of mass destruction, we have some concerns about some of the observations made in his report by the Secretary-General. The report focuses primarily on what it considers as threats emanating from proliferation, but fails to address the more important aspect of threats posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons. In other words, it covers only the notion of “horizontal” proliferation, while avoiding the more critical issue of “vertical” proliferation and the qualitative development of such weapons. In this context, it is worth noting that apart from partial reductions, the nuclear weapons States have failed to fulfill their commitments, thereby exposing the Treaty to the danger of losing its credibility. Indonesia wishes to see nuclear-weapon-states fully implement their commitments and obligations under Article VI of the NPT, including the 13 practical steps, with a view to achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Similarly, while we welcome some of the proposals on negative security assurances, negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty and the moratorium on nuclear testing in the context of the NPT, we remain concerned about the efforts made outside the NPT regime, which are not multilaterally and transparently negotiated, to supplement the NPT. In essence, such initiatives have little value, if any. The challenge is to make the NPT work, and in this connection, we believe that good faith must be demonstrated by the implementation of the provisions of the NPT, not by seeking to supplement it. Also of related concern, in this regard, are the proposals to empower the Security Council to deal with issues of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, and to define the legislative requirements for Member States in implementing its resolutions. In our view, this is unnecessary, and capable of upsetting previously covered negotiations in other, more related multilateral forums. Having said this, my delegation fully endorses the proposal for the revitalization of multilateral frameworks for dealing with threats posed by weapons of mass destruction. Unfortunately, for nearly a decade, such an approach has been marginalized, resulting in a deadlock on numerous disarmament issues. Mr. Facilitator, Let me turn to the subject of terrorism. As a nation that has suffered at the hands of terrorists, Indonesia fully supports every effort to combat this problem, but we would like to stress that success in doing this lies in identifying the root causes of terrorism, a point that is sadly missing from the report of the Secretary-General. In this regard, we support the call for the convening of an international UN conference to discuss and formulate a comprehensive response to terrorism. We are concerned about the proposed definition of terrorism which ignores the legitimate struggle of peoples who are under foreign occupation. We, however, support the Secretary-General’s counter-terrorism strategy and his efforts to secure wider support for it. In addition, we believe that the time is right for the conclusion of the comprehensive Conventions on the basis of the views that have been expressed by Member States. The conclusion, earlier this month, of the Convention on Nuclear Terrorism by the Ad-Hoc Committee established by General Assembly resolution 51/210, provides momentum for consensus on the definition of terrorism, provided that States are willing to demonstrate flexibility. With reference to the subject of the use of force, which has generated some controversy, the Secretary-General has recommended that the Security Council adopt a resolution setting out the principles that would guide it in determining whether to authorize or mandate the use of force. That The Charter of the United Nations provides authority for the use of force in Chapter VII is not in argument. In our view, the issue is the Council’s predisposition to employ the provisions of Chapter VII early and often. We believe that the Council should take advantage of the provisions of Chapter VI and Chapter VIII, thereby leaving Chapter VII as the last resort. On the particular subject of Article 51, Indonesia maintains that every temptation must be avoided to rewrite or reinterpret it. Mr. Facilitator, On the use of Security Council sanctions, my delegation believes that before sanctions are imposed, consideration be given to their impact on the target country, its civilian population, and other countries that might be affected by them. In our view, consultations are of the utmost importance when economic are being considered. Should a sanctions regime be put in place, it should be periodically reviewed and lifted as soon as its objectives have been achieved. Turning to the issue of peacekeeping strategic reserves and standby capacities, my delegation welcomes the initiatives being undertaken to improve the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions, as well as the Secretary-General’s strategic reserve initiative to provide blue helmets with suitable reserves. We look forward to a more detailed and deep exchange of views on this matter and on the Secretary-General’s recommendation for a standing civilian police capacity for peacekeeping operations. Finally, on the subject of the Peacebuilding Commission, my delegation would like to thank the Secretary-General for his explanatory note which was issued yesterday. We have said in a previous intervention that this proposal deserves careful examination. Although there is now more information available about it, some key clarifications still need to be made. The following, however, represent our preliminary observations about the proposal. The first of these concerns is the proposed location of the Commission within the United Nations system. We are not satisfied that the decision to place it under the Security Council will serve the idea best. Peacebuilding, strictly defined, is not peacekeeping. If the Commission must report sequentially to the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council—within the peacebuilding, not peacekeeping period—clear definitions are required in order to ensure that such a scheme can work in practice. Our second concern involves the membership of the Commission. The Secretary-General’s proposed format of 15-20 members that would include some Security Council and ECOSOC members, as well as donor countries and leading troop contributors, deserves some clarification. It is important to establish, for instance, whether the Commission would be led by the members of the Security Council, especially given the sequential reporting proposal in which it would first report to that body. It is important to avoid such a scenario, as it would, in effect, compel the Commission to function like a Security Council committee. In our view, such a situation could lead to operational difficulties when the Commission transits from the Security Council to ECOSOC. As a peace-oriented commission, we prefer that the body focuses on peacebuilding and peacethinking from the beginning by reporting directly to ECOSOC, even though it is imperative that members of the Security Council serve on it as the Secretary-General has recommended. Thank you, Mr. Facilitator.
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